Another Linux kernel flaw has handed local unprivileged users a way to peek at files they should never be able to read, including root-only secrets such as SSH keys. The bug affects multiple LTS kernel lines from 5.10 upward, although a fix has already landed – and there is now a proposal for reducing the odds of similar surprises in future. What FOSS analytics vendor Metabase memorably dubbed the strip-mining era of open source security continues. This time, the culprit is CVE-2026-46333, a local kernel vulnerability that lets an unprivileged user read files they should not be able to access, including those normally available only to root. An attacker who already has login access to an affected machine could therefore potentially grab SSH keys, password files, or other confidential credentials, as the KnightLi blog explains. Despite its official designation, a demo exploit on GitHub calls it ssh-keysign-pwn. It is not quite as catchy a name as Copy Fail, or Dirty Frag, or indeed Fragnesia, but we feel it is safe to say it hasn't been a good month. According to a report on Linux Stans, it affected LTS kernel versions 5.10, 5.15, 6.1, 6.6, 6.12, 6.18 and 7.0. The good news is that it's already been fixed: Linus himself, in commit 31e62c2, called the fix "ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic." The issue was reported on the oss-security list on Friday by security consultancy Qualys, as noted on X by grsecurity's Brad Spengler. In the same thread, Altan Baig pointed out that the underlying issue was reported by Jann Horn on the Linux Kernel Mailing List way back in 2020. The problem with tracking security reports, which Penguin Emperor Torvalds described recently, is not new, alas. ModuleJail This also seems like a good time to look at what we thought was an interesting new defensive measure, Jasper Nuyens' ModuleJail. The top line of the README summarizes it: The mention of "no AI inside the tool" is arguably something of a giveaway, and you can see a CLAUDE.md file in the repo. Even so, how it works is simple enough. Although Linux has a monolithic kernel, it is modular: when the kernel's source code is compiled, the person or tool building it can choose if each individual component is included (built into the binary), not included at all, or compiled as a module, which can be loaded on the fly as and when it's needed. Since the kernel is mostly device drivers, it's normal for distribution vendors to compile most non-essential components as kernel modules – as the Arch wiki explains. Blacklisting a module just means adding its name to a list of modules not to load. Blacklisting unusued models for added security isn't a new idea. It's in the RHEL 6 documentation, for instance, and a DoHost blog post from last year describes it as a security measure. ModuleJail simply automates the process: it blacklists any modules not currently in use. Probably safe for a server, but rather less ideal for a laptop or machine where you need to plug in new hardware on the fly. Connecting a USB headset, say, is quite different from plugging one into a headphone socket. While a device with a jack plug uses your existing sound controller, by connecting a USB one you're effectively adding a new sound controller – just one that happens to be connected over USB. ModuleJail mentions that its approach avoids changing the initramfs. An initramfs, like an initrd, is a file containing a temporary RAM disk, so that a generic kernel can find and load the drivers it needs for the particular box it's running on – even before it can find the machine's SSD and mount the root partition. Back in the 1990s, as grumpy old graybeards such as this vulture recall, recompiling your kernel was a standard part of periodic system maintenance. One benefit of building the kernel customized for your own computer was eliminating the need for an initramfs. If all the drivers are built in, there's no need for this temporary stage, although as the ArchWiki notes, this does limit some advanced features, which, for instance, systemd uses. We would love to see some of the systemd-free distros incorporate such automatic ModuleJail-style identification of essential modules, and use it to build a custom kernel on the fly, then banish the use of initramfs. (Maybe just keep the all-options-enabled installation kernel around as an emergency fallback.) Aside from a few special cases such as OpenZFS, this should work on most hardware – and make life simpler, quicker, and perhaps slightly more secure. ®
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