Matthew Butterick is a lawyer, programmer, writer, and designer. Heâs written a long, interesting piece about the inherent risks of AI called Extinction-Level Capitalism. It is well-worth a read; Iâve excerpted several passages here but urge you read the whole thing.
In pracÂtice, certain people in a capiÂtalist liberal democÂracy tend to get increasÂingly rich. Absent counÂterÂmeaÂsures, the wealthy gain control of the politÂical appaÂratus, thwarting liberal-demoÂcÂratic norms. This tension between capital and poliÂtics is a long-considÂered topic. A key early work was, of course, Karl Marxâs Capital (about which more later). In the current era, Mancur Olsonâs book The Rise and Decline of Nations set out how small groups with a shared interest (which could include capital concenÂtraÂtion) can effecÂtively underÂmine stable sociÂeties. More recently, econÂoÂmists Robert Reich (âHow CapiÂtalism is Killing DemocÂracyâ), James Galbraith (The Predator State), and Yanis VaroÂufakis (TechÂnofeuÂdalism: What Killed CapiÂtalism) are among those who have studied the escaÂlating politÂical conseÂquences of rising wealth inequality. The synthesis might be: as more wealth becomes concenÂtrated in the hands of fewer citiÂzens, liberal democÂracy weakens, because whichever citiÂzens are losing economic releÂvance will also lose politÂical releÂvance. A nation sending many of its citiÂzens toward economic irrelÂeÂvance risks becoming politÂiÂcally illibÂeral.
Sci-fi plots are optiÂmized for cineÂmatic impact. So as a metaphor for AI risk, they can lead to faulty intuÂitions. Among realÂistic AI risks, we can expect that most will be boring, slow, and depend on minimal extra techÂnology. Whether AI will cause literal human extincÂtion is esotericâa lightÂning strike. But AI could easily induce future economic and politÂical condiÂtions that most AmerÂiÂcans today would consider intolÂerÂableâa cancer that extinÂguishes a certain way of life. Nobodyâs going to make a movie about boring AI risks. But they comprise the majority of worriÂsome AI outcomes.
Marxâs obserÂvaÂtion has a subtler impliÂcaÂtion too. New techÂnology often holds itself out as the starting point of a narraÂtive: from now on, everyÂthing is different. When we consider the techÂnology alone, that narraÂtive domiÂnates. But when we zoom out and consider the historÂical context, the new techÂnology becomes the current endpoint of a much longer politÂical narraÂtive.
What would Marx say to AI criticsâsocial, legal, economic, politÂicalâthat have arisen so far? Maybe that weâre missing the bigger picture. That as a human invenÂtion, AI may be the starting point of a new techÂnoÂlogÂical narraÂtive. But as an affront to human workers, it continues a long tradiÂtion of capiÂtalist techÂnoloÂgies, beginÂning with the IndusÂtrial RevoÂluÂtion (if not earlier).
When we think about AI risk, weâre necesÂsarily making guesses about the future. But when we frame AI in the narrow sense of new techÂnology, weâre primarily considÂering a timeÂline that starts now. Whereas when we shift to thinking of AI as a capiÂtalist instruÂment, weâre considÂering a timeÂline that starts centuries ago and has evolved continÂuÂously into the present. We can and should study those existing economic and politÂical trends, because those will likely shape the future trajecÂtory. Put differÂently: AI may be new. But itâs not immune to history.
âTechÂnology always makes certain jobs obsoÂlete; new ones will arise.â AIâs predicted labor replaceÂment is unpreceÂdented in three ways: the diverÂsity of tasks replaced; its outsize effect on highly educated workers; and the backÂdrop of 50 years of wage stagÂnaÂtion. AutomaÂtion-driven tranÂsiÂtions arenât necesÂsarily easy, even when theyâre narrow and the economy can absorb the workers. Those who handÂwave over the details should study historÂical examÂples. When you tell a large group of workers that their skills no longer have economic value, you risk a politÂical and social tinderbox. Recall Carl Benedikt Freyâs comment: âthe short run can be a lifeÂtimeâ.
Along these lines, I expect that to succeed finanÂcially, Big AI will likely need to demolish a signifÂiÂcant number of existing tech compaÂnies and grab their revenue for itself. By the process described above: Big AI essenÂtially uses its tech customers as an R&D facility. Big AI licenses models to these compaÂnies. Tech compaÂnies compete to adapt their busiÂnesses to AI. Once a concept is proven, Big AI directly takes over that market. The labor-replaceÂment story will grow into a company-replaceÂment story. Many of those tech compaÂniesâand their shareÂholders in the public marketsâmay also find that AI is a poisoned chalice.
The value of the concenÂtrated resource creates what Jeffrey Frankel calls âa politÂical contest to capture ownerÂshipâ, which in turn encourÂages the emerÂgence of autoÂcratic or oligarchic instiÂtuÂtions captured by an economic elite who seek to retain control of the resource. The process is self-reinÂforcing in two ways. First: the economic elite uses its wealth to repress politÂical oppoÂnents. Second: as the governÂment derives more income from the concenÂtrated resource, it relies less on taxaÂtion of citiÂzens, which weakens demoÂcÂratic accountÂability.
I could have easily excerpted the whole thing.
Tags: anthropic ¡ artificial intelligence ¡ business ¡ capitalism ¡ Google ¡ Matthew Butterick ¡ openai ¡ usa
/s3/static.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/15161630/150626BIN_2034440164_jacco.jpg)
/s3/static.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/15182953/150626BUI_2034487022_VK.jpg)
