banzainetsurfer has added a photo to the pool:
There was simply no debate over the moment of the match and it is one that Iran will cherish, even more so if they are to progress to the World Cup knockout stage for the first time. Every angle of Alireza Beiranvand’s preposterous save to prevent Belgium taking the lead approaching the hour adds to the miraculous nature of it all. Perhaps the most ludicrous element was that Beiranvand had seesawed to his left in an attempt to intercept Kevin De Bruyne’s rolled cross into the six-yard box and yet, scrambling on the turf, stuck out a left glove to shut the door in the face of Maxim De Cuyper. Belgium finished with 10 men after Nathan Ngoy was sent off for hauling down Mehdi Taremi.
If Iran advance to the last 32, they will surely reflect on Beiranvand’s divine intervention. De Bruyne glittered in moments, none more so than graciously bringing Leandro Trossard’s lifted pass down on the byline. Beiranvand made it his mission to reach De Bruyne’s pass before Romelu Lukaku, who by starting became the third-most capped Belgium player. In the end Ali Nemati stopped the cross, legs splayed as Beiranvand thwarted De Cuyper. Iran believes. Meanwhile Belgium, who went out at the group stage four years ago, are in a spot of bother.
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Tech Times reports:
Linux 7.2's merge window closed out a cleanup campaign on Friday that most kernel developers had stopped expecting to see end: the complete removal of strncpy(), a C string-copy function that the kernel's own documentation labels "actively dangerous," from every subsystem, driver, and architecture-specific file in the kernel source tree.
The merge landed June 20, 2026. After around 362 commits spread across six years of incremental work, no call site using the function remained, and the function itself — including the last per-CPU-architecture optimized implementations — was struck from the source. The removal matters beyond housekeeping. strncpy() is a persistent source of a specific class of memory error: kernel buffers that contain sensitive data can leak bytes past an unterminated string boundary, a pattern that enables memory disclosure vulnerabilities. Eliminating the function from the tree removes that entire class from the kernel's attack surface — and, critically, makes strncpy() unavailable to any future contributor, turning a best-practice suggestion into an enforced policy.
Phoronix notes it's replaced by five different functions:
In place of strncpy, Linux kernel code should use strscpy() for NUL terminated destinations, strscpy_pad() for NUl-terminated destinations with zero-padding, strtomem_pad() for non-NUL-terminated fixed-width fields, memcpy_and_pad() for bounded copies with explicit padding, or memcpy() for known-length memory copies.
"The reason five functions were needed," explains Tech Times, "is that different parts of the kernel were using strncpy() for five semantically distinct memory operations — each with a different intent, different termination requirement, and different padding behavior. "
The original function obscured all of those differences under a single ambiguous name. The 362-commit campaign to replace it was, in effect, a codebase-wide audit that forced every call site to declare its actual intent in code That is an engineering outcome with lasting value: the kernel's string-handling semantics are now explicit where they were previously implicit, and future maintainers can read a function name and understand what a copy operation actually does.
Linux 7.2's merge window closed out a cleanup campaign on Friday that most kernel developers had stopped expecting to see end: the complete removal of strncpy(), a C string-copy function that the kernel's own documentation labels "actively dangerous," from every subsystem, driver, and architecture-specific file in the kernel source tree.
The merge landed June 20, 2026. After around 362 commits spread across six years of incremental work, no call site using the function remained, and the function itself — including the last per-CPU-architecture optimized implementations — was struck from the source. The removal matters beyond housekeeping. strncpy() is a persistent source of a specific class of memory error: kernel buffers that contain sensitive data can leak bytes past an unterminated string boundary, a pattern that enables memory disclosure vulnerabilities. Eliminating the function from the tree removes that entire class from the kernel's attack surface — and, critically, makes strncpy() unavailable to any future contributor, turning a best-practice suggestion into an enforced policy.
Phoronix notes it's replaced by five different functions:
In place of strncpy, Linux kernel code should use strscpy() for NUL terminated destinations, strscpy_pad() for NUl-terminated destinations with zero-padding, strtomem_pad() for non-NUL-terminated fixed-width fields, memcpy_and_pad() for bounded copies with explicit padding, or memcpy() for known-length memory copies.
"The reason five functions were needed," explains Tech Times, "is that different parts of the kernel were using strncpy() for five semantically distinct memory operations — each with a different intent, different termination requirement, and different padding behavior. "
The original function obscured all of those differences under a single ambiguous name. The 362-commit campaign to replace it was, in effect, a codebase-wide audit that forced every call site to declare its actual intent in code That is an engineering outcome with lasting value: the kernel's string-handling semantics are now explicit where they were previously implicit, and future maintainers can read a function name and understand what a copy operation actually does.
Read more of this story at Slashdot.
BertvB posted a photo:
A captivating abstract perspective of the spectacular umbrella-covered ceiling inside Pantropica (formerly Orchideeënhoeve) in Luttelgeest, Netherlands.