Sanctions experts said they expect the U.S. to either issue a short-term extension or grant specific exemptions to major Asian refineries.

Heerlen wil weg uit de top van ‘slechte lijstjes’ over armoede, slechte gezondheid en criminaliteit. Een AI-project, met steun van de EU, moet de stad daarbij helpen. Amnesty International ziet vooral risico’s. „Dit soort proeven lopen steeds op hetzelfde uit: privacy-schendingen, etnisch profileren, discriminatie.”

Ukrainian president says Europe must ‘have a strong voice and presence’ amid search for candidate who could lead any talks with Putin

The cruise ship was carrying 25 crew members and two medical personnel as it reached Rotterdam, AP noted.

An AP journalist saw occupants wearing masks on the deck as the boat was escorted through the port by a tug boat and a Dutch police boat. Authorities say that the crew will enter immediate quarantine.

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The final is the most expensive ticket on resale for this summer’s tournaments. But there are surprising get-in prices elsewhere

It’s no surprise that the most expensive World Cup resale tickets are for the final. But the next priciest is a group game between two nations who have never reached that stage.

A ticket to the Colombia v Portugal group game in Miami on 27 June is the tournament’s second-most expensive seat on the resale marketplace, with a cheapest asking price of $2,254 as of 17 May, according to TicketData.com, an analysis site.

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Airline says travellers are leaving it longer to book and those buying flights later this year could face higher prices

• Business live – latest updates

Ryanair is “confident” it will not face a jet fuel shortage this summer amid fears over widespread cancellations linked to the Iran war, but warned holidaymakers booking their flights later this year could face higher fares.

Neil Sorahan, the chief financial officer at the budget airline, said he was “increasingly confident that we will not see any supply shocks this summer”.

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Twitter-essay!

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Kwestie 1: Gidi zei in de camera van Left Laser dat Palestijnse vluchtelingen - die nu de grootste groep vluchtelingen richting Nederland vormt - door onze overheid "tegengehouden moeten worden met misschien nog wel meer geweld dan waar ze vandaan komen". Aangiftes door godbetert de body double van Joshua Livestro en The Rights Forum volgden. Nu noemt Gidi deze uitlating "gewoon onhandig geformuleerd" en licht toe wat hij probeerde over te brengen:

"Ik heb gepleit voor een asielstop en heb dat in de emotie onhandig verwoord. Wat ik bedoelde is dat een asielstop, als die er komt, gehandhaafd moet worden door de KMAR conform de bestaande geweldsinstructie. Maar laat ik kristalhelder zijn: het geweldsmonopolie ligt uitsluitend bij de overheid. Dat heb ik meerdere keren expliciet gezegd, maar doe ik bij deze nogmaals ondubbelzinnig. Eventueel geweld mag alleen worden toegepast als het echt niet anders kan, maar altijd proportioneel, zorgvuldig en binnen de grenzen van onze rechtsstaat en Nederlandse normen. Dat had ik duidelijker moeten formuleren."

Kwestie 2: O M V O L K I N G. U wordt vervangen maar wat nog veel belangrijker is, is dat u doet alsof het niet zo is. Daarover zegt Gidi in de bovenstaande reactie:

"Dan over het woord ‘omvolking’. In een heimelijk opgenomen privégesprek gebruik ik dat woord reactief. Ik gebruik dat woord zelf niet actief, maar ik maak mij wel ernstige zorgen over het open-grenzenbeleid. Als we daar niets aan veranderen, zal de bevolkingssamenstelling van Nederland ingrijpend veranderen, met grote gevolgen voor onze cultuur, cohesie en vrijheid."

Helder! Benieuwd naar de derde controverse en of de aangifteformulieren voor het gemak gewoon fatsoenlijk vooraf gedrukt kunnen worden.

Zelfde tekst, maar nu met pictogrammen

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De enige mic die telt

OPINION The terms "blindingly obvious," "logical consequence," and "that is not how it works" appear nowhere in the government handbook of internet legislation. In particular, the discovery that imposing age access controls on websites has pushed users to VPNs has come as a huge surprise to legislators in the UK, the EU, Canada, and Australia. Nobody here knows how old VPN users are, be they kids unwilling to lose access or adults unwilling to disgorge personally identifying data to who knows what. As they recover from this shocking discovery, these fine people are looking at ways to control VPNs, whether by adding age verification here too or by some magical "digital age of consent" technology that somehow evades the paradox that demanding more personal information in the name of safety itself reduces safety. Yet here, as in so many ways, the rest of the world is lagging behind America – more specifically, the great state of Utah, which has just enacted an anti-VPN law. This law makes it compulsory for any site that the state says needs age verification – porn, basically – to impose those checks on anyone physically in Utah whether or not they are using any VPN. Those would be the same VPNs whose sole purpose is to prevent the geolocation of their users. Which would seem, and is, another paradox. The only way to comply is to impose global age checks, effectively giving Utah worldwide regulatory powers. As there is no global standard for this, it's not a practical option. But then, there are no practical options to control VPNs, short of cutting off all internet access à la North Korea. Even China, the world's most effective cyber-authoritarian state and one which very much enjoys telling its citizens what to think, has to be very wary of putting the VPN screws on too harshly. The ground truth about VPNs is that if you allow people access to anywhere on the internet outside your direct control, they can access a VPN. Obvious vectors of denial, such as blacklisting VPN ingress or egress IP ranges, don't work for long. VPN operators are adept at moving these, and you can build your VPN infrastructure in the cloud, and there are plenty of stealth techniques. A VPN pipe looks to any router it traverses like an encrypted bitstream, which is to say like most internet traffic, and if you disguise the session establishment ports and protocols, it’s HTTPS going about its lawful business. All this adds up to a landscape where hundreds of VPN providers are able to react to any official monitoring or clampdown in ways that leave them more resilient and more expensive to tamper with. China knows this, discouraging rather than preventing access altogether, and putting the squeeze on only briefly as occasion demands. The reason age verification works as far as it does for social and salacious media is that these are advertising-driven, which means having a commercial presence everywhere they have advertisers. That puts their cash flow at the mercy of local regulators, which is how the British pirate radio ships of the 1960s were closed down. They operated in international waters and couldn't be jammed, so the UK government made it illegal to advertise on them. VPNs take your money directly, so don't react to local edicts. Plus, even if none of the above were true, VPNs are so essential to enterprise security, and are so available as open source, that they could no more be banned or backdoored than, say, HTTPS. VPNs are bombproof, as far as sense extends. Which means attempts to bomb them into compliance or out of existence in a fit of epic fury will work as well on the internet as it does in the desert. Lots of collateral damage, not so much victory. This isn't an unalloyed good, as the consumer VPN market is far less competitive than it appears and there are plenty of questions about connections between those who control VPNs and various national security interests. A VPN service is literally a man in the middle you pay to use, and assigning trust is up to you. Freedom rarely comes for free, and it would be unwise to rely on any VPN you can't check out if you're doing anything that might summon the intelligence services. Most of us aren't, at least in the free world, at least for now. VPNs, for all their faults, remain a genuine and essential brick in our antisurveillance Lego set. It is very much in our interests that we aren't forced to disclose additional identifying data to them, and that they're not used as an excuse to effectively close down services and sites a particular state dislikes. The Utah law may yet fail on various grounds, as it has already been challenged in court – although given the way the American legal system is being stress-tested right now, this is harder to call than it should be. If it stands, then it will spread to like-minded states like butter across a hot pan. The obvious consequence will be that people move their attention to smaller, less savory sites more resistant to state interdiction. This will come as a surprise to nobody except the legislators. Outside the US, the progress of the Utah experiment will be watched closely by those who see VPNs as loopholes to be blocked. It's our job to demonstrate that VPN regulation would be counterproductive and dangerous, and that concentrating on reducing harm at source is better than forcing consumers to reveal ID and tampering with the infrastructure. ®

OPINION The terms "blindingly obvious," "logical consequence," and "that is not how it works" appear nowhere in the government handbook of internet legislation. In particular, the discovery that imposing age access controls on websites has pushed users to VPNs has come as a huge surprise to legislators in the UK, the EU, Canada, and Australia. Nobody here knows how old VPN users are, be they kids unwilling to lose access or adults unwilling to disgorge personally identifying data to who knows what. As they recover from this shocking discovery, these fine people are looking at ways to control VPNs, whether by adding age verification here too or by some magical "digital age of consent" technology that somehow evades the paradox that demanding more personal information in the name of safety itself reduces safety. Yet here, as in so many ways, the rest of the world is lagging behind America – more specifically, the great state of Utah, which has just enacted an anti-VPN law. This law makes it compulsory for any site that the state says needs age verification – porn, basically – to impose those checks on anyone physically in Utah whether or not they are using any VPN. Those would be the same VPNs whose sole purpose is to prevent the geolocation of their users. Which would seem, and is, another paradox. The only way to comply is to impose global age checks, effectively giving Utah worldwide regulatory powers. As there is no global standard for this, it's not a practical option. But then, there are no practical options to control VPNs, short of cutting off all internet access à la North Korea. Even China, the world's most effective cyber-authoritarian state and one which very much enjoys telling its citizens what to think, has to be very wary of putting the VPN screws on too harshly. The ground truth about VPNs is that if you allow people access to anywhere on the internet outside your direct control, they can access a VPN. Obvious vectors of denial, such as blacklisting VPN ingress or egress IP ranges, don't work for long. VPN operators are adept at moving these, and you can build your VPN infrastructure in the cloud, and there are plenty of stealth techniques. A VPN pipe looks to any router it traverses like an encrypted bitstream, which is to say like most internet traffic, and if you disguise the session establishment ports and protocols, it’s HTTPS going about its lawful business. All this adds up to a landscape where hundreds of VPN providers are able to react to any official monitoring or clampdown in ways that leave them more resilient and more expensive to tamper with. China knows this, discouraging rather than preventing access altogether, and putting the squeeze on only briefly as occasion demands. The reason age verification works as far as it does for social and salacious media is that these are advertising-driven, which means having a commercial presence everywhere they have advertisers. That puts their cash flow at the mercy of local regulators, which is how the British pirate radio ships of the 1960s were closed down. They operated in international waters and couldn't be jammed, so the UK government made it illegal to advertise on them. VPNs take your money directly, so don't react to local edicts. Plus, even if none of the above were true, VPNs are so essential to enterprise security, and are so available as open source, that they could no more be banned or backdoored than, say, HTTPS. VPNs are bombproof, as far as sense extends. Which means attempts to bomb them into compliance or out of existence in a fit of epic fury will work as well on the internet as it does in the desert. Lots of collateral damage, not so much victory. This isn't an unalloyed good, as the consumer VPN market is far less competitive than it appears and there are plenty of questions about connections between those who control VPNs and various national security interests. A VPN service is literally a man in the middle you pay to use, and assigning trust is up to you. Freedom rarely comes for free, and it would be unwise to rely on any VPN you can't check out if you're doing anything that might summon the intelligence services. Most of us aren't, at least in the free world, at least for now. VPNs, for all their faults, remain a genuine and essential brick in our antisurveillance Lego set. It is very much in our interests that we aren't forced to disclose additional identifying data to them, and that they're not used as an excuse to effectively close down services and sites a particular state dislikes. The Utah law may yet fail on various grounds, as it has already been challenged in court – although given the way the American legal system is being stress-tested right now, this is harder to call than it should be. If it stands, then it will spread to like-minded states like butter across a hot pan. The obvious consequence will be that people move their attention to smaller, less savory sites more resistant to state interdiction. This will come as a surprise to nobody except the legislators. Outside the US, the progress of the Utah experiment will be watched closely by those who see VPNs as loopholes to be blocked. It's our job to demonstrate that VPN regulation would be counterproductive and dangerous, and that concentrating on reducing harm at source is better than forcing consumers to reveal ID and tampering with the infrastructure. ®

Drie op de vier statushouders zit jaren na aankomst in Nederland nog steeds zonder werk. Niet omdat zij niet willen, maar omdat zij vastlopen in een systeem dat hen onvoldoende op weg helpt. Dat blijkt uit recente cijfers waar minister Thierry Aartsen (Werk en Participatie) zich op baseert. Tegelijkertijd klinkt vanuit werkgevers, uitzenders en maatschappelijke partners al jaren dezelfde boodschap: er is ruimte op de arbeidsmarkt. Terwijl personeelstekorten oplopen, blijft een groot arbeidspotentieel onbenut. Dat wringt. Werk is immers de sleutel tot integratie, taal en zelfstandigheid. Deze mismatch vraagt geen nieuwe plannen, maar een gezamenlijke verantwoordelijkheid om belemmeringen in de keten eindelijk écht weg te nemen.

Het is positief dat de minister met startbanen inzet op meer perspectief. Werk is meer dan inkomen: het versnelt integratie en vergroot zelfredzaamheid. Maar de kern van het probleem blijft bestaan. De bereidheid om te werken is er, de toegang niet. Dat nog altijd 75% van de statushouders in de eerste jaren niet werkt, is een gemiste kans, voor mensen én voor sectoren die structureel personeel tekortkomen.

Stranden in goede bedoelingen

Er zijn al veel goede voorbeelden waarin nieuwkomers succesvol aan het werk zijn. Zodra zij starten, zien we gemotiveerde werknemers en tevreden werkgevers. Toch strandt het nog te vaak in goede bedoelingen. Beleid werkt alleen als werken ook écht mogelijk wordt gemaakt. Nu gebeurt vaak het tegenovergestelde: het inburgeringsproces bijvoorbeeld belemmert instroom eerder dan dat het deze versnelt.

Daar bovenop komen concrete drempels zoals beperkte mobiliteit, onvoldoende financiële prikkels en verhuizingen tussen opvanglocaties die stabiliteit ondermijnen. Dit zijn geen randzaken, maar structurele blokkades.

Als startbanen moeten werken, is een losse maatregel niet genoeg. Nodig is een integrale ketenaanpak waarin werkgevers, uitzenders, overheid en maatschappelijke partners samen verantwoordelijkheid nemen. Minder losse initiatieven, meer samenhang en continuïteit. Alleen dan benutten we het potentieel dat er al is en maken we van werk voor statushouders de norm in plaats van de uitzondering.